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SEPTEMBER-OCTOBER 1960
CARRIER'S DUTY TO COLLECT FULL
APPLICABLE TARIFF RATE
By WILLIAM E. KENWORTHY*
Probably the most inflexibly applied duty known to current
law is the duty of a carrier to collect the full applicable tariff rate.
As a result some apparently surprising decisions, which would be
anachronisms to the common law, are commonly reached. How-
ever, analysis of the historical alternatives discloses that this in-
flexibility is generally necessary if discrimination between shippers
is to be avoided.
With respect to motor carriers, the statutory basis for the duty
to collect the full applicable tariff rate is found partially in section
316 of the Interstate Commerce Act,' which creates the duty not
only to establish and observe just and reasonable rates but also to
enforce such rates. More specifically, however, section 317 (b)
'2
states:
No common carrier by motor vehicle shall charge or de-
mand or collect or receive a greater or less or different com-
pensation for transportation or for any service in connec-
tion therewith between the points enumerated in such tariff
than the rates, fares, and charges specified in the tariffs in
effect at the time and no such carrier shall refund or remit
in any manner or by any device, directly or indirectly, or
through any agent or broker or otherwise, any portion of
the rates, fares, or charges so specified, or extend to any
person any privileges or facilities for transportation in in-
terstate or foreign commerce except such as are specified in
its tariffs: Provided, That the provisions of sections 1 (7)
and 22 of this title shall apply to common carriers by motor
vehicles subject to this chapter.
A similar duty is imposed upon railroads3 and the decisions constru-
ing that section are applicable to motor carriers.
The original authoritative statement concerning the extent of
the duty of a common carrier to collect the applicable tariff is found
in Pittsburgh, Cincinnati, Chicago and St. Louis Railway Co. v.
Fink4 in which the carrier had brought an action against a consignee
to recover the difference between the charge required by tariff, and
the amount originally paid by the consignee. The Court specifically
held that neither prior agreement with the carrier nor estoppel
would constitute a successful defense in an action based upon the
statutory requirement of equal rates. The extent of this statutory
duty is such that the carrier may successfully maintain an action
to collect the tariff rate even in cases where the carrier has know-
ingly quoted an illegally low rate, and the shipper has innocently
*Mr. Kenworthy was awarded the LL.B. degree cum laude from the University of Denver College of
Low in 1956. He is in the Colorado Springs offices of the firm Fugate, May, Mitchem and McGinley.
149 U.S.C. § 316 (1951).
249 U.S.C. I 317(b) (1951).
3 49 U.S.C. § 6(7) (1951).
4 250 U.S. 577 (1919).
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relied on the quotation to its detriment.5 In Peters-Quigan Corp. v.
Long Transp. Co.,6 the Interstate Commerce Commission stated:
There is no legal basis for charging rates on the article
other than that embraced in the classification description.
Under sec. 217 (b) of the Act, the defendants are prohibit-
ed from demanding, collecting or receiving compensation at
rates other than the rates contained in the tariffs on the
article actually shipped. Neither misunderstandings nor
agreements among shippers or receivers and carriers can
affect these statutory provisions which obligate the carriers
to collect, and the shippers or receivers to pay amounts no
different than the applicable rates.
In effect duly filed tariffs bind both the carrier and the shipper with
the force of law.7
In specific instances it has been held that a carrier is not barred
from collecting the full applicable rates even though it has uninten-
tionally and mistakenly failed to collect the proper amount," or has
made an honest mistake in classification after a thorough effort to
determine the applicable tariff.9 Similarly, no showing of hardship
upon the shipper will excuse payment of the full rate.' The effect
of these rules is summed up in the statement, "Equitable considera-
tions may not serve to justify failure of a carrier to collect, or re-
tention by a shipper of, any part of lawful tariff charges."
11
In actions brought by a carrier to recover the amount of under-
charges on a previous shipment, interest may be charged from the
date that the amount became due. This has been approached as a
matter of general common law which is a part of the federal right
to collect the full amount of the applicable tariff. 2 The claim for
undercharges has also been treated as one for a liquidated amount
such that interest may be recovered under the Colorado statutes.13
In view of the fact that the duty to collect the full tariff charge
is absolute and statutory, it necessarily follows that any settlement
or compromise of the shippers liability is void on its face. There-
fore, neither settlement nor accord and satisfaction will constitute
a valid defense to an action by the carrier to recover an under-
charge. 14 As a result litigation of even the smallest matters must be
pursued.' 5 For the same reasons it is not permissible for the shipper
to withhold from his payment sums allegedly due in compensation
for damage to the shipment. After payment of the tariff charges,
complaint may then be filed by the consignee for damages as a re-
sult of delay or other act of the shipper. 16
Another aspect of the rule requires strict compliance by the
shipper with all tariff rules and regulations as well as payment in
full. Thus in Union Pacific R.R. Co. v. Corneli Seed Co.1T it was
5 Hughes Transp., Inc. v. United States, 121 F. Supp. 212 (1954).
6 64 M.C.C. 581.
7 Union Pacific R.R. Co. v. Corneli Seed Co., 161 F. Supp. 52 (S.D. Idaho 1958).
8 Cent. Warehouse Co. v. Chicago, R.1, & P. Ry. Co., 20 F.2d 828 (1927).
9 Peters-Quigan Corp. v. Long Transp. Co., 64 M.C.C. 581.
10 Railway Express Agency v. Atlantic & Pac. Wire & Cable Co., 172 N.Y.S.2d 749 (1958).
11 Baldwin v. Scott Milling Co., 307 U.S. 478 (1939).
12 T. & M. Transp. Co. v. S.W. Shattuck Chem Co., 158 F.2d 909 (10th Cir. 1947).
13 Ibid.
14 Galveston, H. & S. A. Ry. Co. v. Lykes Bros., 294 Fed. 968 (D.C. Tex. 1923).
15 In United States v. Bethke, 132 F. Supp. 22 (D.C. Colo. 1955) the anount in controversy was
$69.71.
16 Supra, note 10.
17 Supra, note 7.
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held that a processor receiving seeds for processing and then re-
shipping them to their final destination was not entitled to the
benefit of a transit or single factor rate upon ceasing to comply with
the regulations governing that tariff. The rule required the out-
bound bill of lading to show the point of origin of the shipment.
Even though former compliance with the rule had resulted in loss
of business to competitors, it was observed that the shipper must
comply with every pertinent provision of the tariff in order to se-
cure the lower rates established therein.
Only two exceptions are known to exist to the rule that a carrier
must collect the full amount of any undercharge which has oc-
curred. The first exception to the rule exists where a carrier has
transported goods under contract with the United States Govern-
ment. In such cases, only the contract price may be recovered; for
Section 22 of the act1 provides that, "Nothing in this chapter shall
prevent the carriage, storage, or handling of property free or at re-
duced rates for the United States." This exception applies, however,
only where the carriage was pursuant to an express agreement be-
tween the government and the carrier. Otherwise the applicable
tariff applies and it becomes the carrier's duty to collect the full
amount. Connecting carriers are apparently not bound by such con-
tracts in the absence of some concurrence on their part, privity of
contract, or at least conscious acquiescence. 19
The only defense which may be asserted by a private shipper
is the statute of limitations. The controlling statute in this respect
1849 U.S.C. § 22 (1951).
19 United States v. Bethke, 132 F. Supp. 22 (D.C. Colo. 1955).
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is section 16 (3),20 which provides, "All actions at law by carriers
subject to this chapter for recovery of their charges, or any part
thereof, shall be begun within two years from the time the cause of
action accrues, and not thereafter." A state statute of limitations
cannot apply to actions by an interstate carrier for recovery of un-
dercharges.
21
With respect to intra-state shipments within Colorado, similar
results from those mentioned above are required.2 2 The statute ex-
pressly prohibits the carrier from receiving different compensation
from that filed in its schedule of tariffs. Both direct and indirect
evasions of the rule are banned.
A somewhat unique attempt to avoid the effect of this statute
was presented by a recent Colorado case.2 3 This was an action to
recover freight charges. Defendant was understandably disturbed
because the carrier's agent had misstated the rate, resulting in an
error of $482.04. Defendant had re-sold the goods carried in the be-
lief that the low rate mis-quoted to him established his costs. Con-
sequently a counter claim in tort was filed, based upon the alleged
negligence of the agent. The Colorado court held that the rule re-
quiring collection of the full applicable rate is not subject to evasion
on the basis of an alleged tort claim. It is of interest that the court
also emphasized the similarity between state and federal statutes
in this matter.
It was not always thus. One might have expected special con-
tracts to be prohibited by the provision in the Colorado Constitution
proscribing "undue or unreasonable discrimination" or "preference
in furnishing cars or motive power. '24 However, the legality of re-
bates was upheld in Bayles v. Kansas Pacific Ry. Co.25 where a ship-
per brought suit to recover the balance of a rebate due under a spe-
cial contract with the defendant at lower than the published rates.
Judgement on demurrer for the defendant was reversed. It was held
that railway companies may discriminate so long as such discrimina-
tion is neither unjust nor unreasonable. In the absence of a showing
that such rates and privileges would not be extended to others simi-
larly situated the special contract was fully enforceable. In a sub-
sequent appeal of the same case 6 the court re-affirmed the stand
previously taken, pointing out that neither the common law nor the
Colorado Constitution prohibited contracts to transport persons or
freight at less than scheduled rates. In that opinion the court stat-
ed: "It is contended that unreasonable discrimination can best be
prevented by declaring all contracts for rebates void; but this rule
has the disadvantage of allowing a common carrier to profit by its
own iniquity."
Obviously it would be virtually impossible to prove that a car-
rier would not offer similar rates to other shippers similarly situat-
ed. Hence, the former rule offered no protection to the shipper
against discrimination. Cast in this background the rigidity of the
present rule that the carrier must collect the full applicable tariff
rate becomes excusable.
20 49 U.S.C. 1 16(3) (1951).
21 Strawberry Growers Selling Co. v. American Ry. Express Co.. 31 F.2d 947 (5th Cir. 1929).
22 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 115-3-5 (1953).
23 Denver & Rio Grande Western R.R. Co. v. Marty, 12 Colo. Bar Ass'n Adv. Sh. 615 (1960).
24 Colo. Const. art. XV, I 6. The provision applies only to railroads.
25 13 Colo. 181, 22 Pac. 341 (1889).
26 Kansas Pac. Ry. Co. v. Bayles, 19 Colo. 348, 35 Pac. 744 (1894).
